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STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
Substantive session of 1994
Agenda item 6 (k)
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUESTIONS

# International cooperation to mitigate the environmental consequences on Kuwait and other countries in the region resulting from the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

## Report of the Secretary-General

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The report entitled "Updated scientific report on the environmental effects of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait" (UNEP/GC.17/INF.9), was submitted for information to the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) at its seventeenth session, held from 10 to 21 May 1993. The report was prepared in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 47/151 of 18 December 1992 and summarizes the results of the inter-agency efforts of the United Nations in responding to the environmental crisis in the Kuwait region. It provides an update of the environmental situation, based on the scientific results obtained through the surveys and assessments carried out under and in relation to the Inter-agency Plan of Action for the Region Covered by the Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME) and briefly describes United Nations initiatives to mitigate the adverse effects of the conflict and rehabilitate the environment in the region.

* A/49/50/Rev.1.

## II. UNITED NATIONS INTER-AGENCY PLAN OF ACTION

2. The United Nations agencies led by UNEP and in cooperation with ROPME, developed the United Nations Inter-agency Plan of Action soon after the liberation of Kuwait. The main objectives of the Plan were:

(a) To assess the environmental consequences of the war on the marine and coastal areas, atmosphere and terrestrial ecosystems and the hazardous waste situation in the region;

(b) To propose a programme for the mitigation of the adverse effects, and for rehabilitation and protection of the environment affected by the conflict.

3. The first phase of the United Nations Inter-agency Plan of Action started on 20 April 1991 and was completed in 90 days, that is, on 21 July 1991. It involved initial surveys and a preliminary assessment of the environmental damage to the region in the aftermath of the conflict.

## III. STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT

4. The preliminary results of the Plan of Action were published by UNEP in its report of 12 October 1991, 1/ and were updated on 12 June 1992. The initial findings of the Plan of Action are summarized below, together with results from a 100-day research cruise conducted in the ROPME sea area by the research vessel Mount Mitchell of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the United States of America during the period February to June 1992.

### A. Marine and coastal environment

#### 1. Results of the initial surveys of the United Nations Inter-agency Plan of Action

5. Between 19 and 28 January 1991, an estimated 6 million to 8 million barrels of oil were spilled into the ROPME sea area. Moreover, atmospheric fallout from Kuwait's damaged wells gradually introduced a considerable additional quantity of oil in the form of small oil droplets and oily soot.

6. As the main body of the oil slick moved south along the Saudi Arabian coast, the areas affected most heavily were the lagoons, salt marshes and bays located between Ras Al-Khafji to the north and Ras Abu Ali to the south. At least 30,000 marine birds perished. Approximately 20 per cent of the mangroves on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia have been oiled and about 50 per cent of the coral reefs have been affected. The Iranian coast north of Bandar Khomeyni was also affected, while the Iraqi and Kuwaiti coasts suffered only relatively light damage.

7. The physical destruction of beaches by digging trenches, laying mines, barbed wire and other defence installations damaged the intertidal zone and the destruction of sewage treatment plants in Kuwait resulted in the release of over

50,000 cubic metres per day of raw sewage into Kuwait Bay, posing a great danger to human and animal life.

## 2. Results of the Mount Mitchell research cruise

8. The intensive United Nations effort to assess the state of the marine environment culminated in the launching, in late February 1992, of a 100-day research cruise in the ROPME sea area by the fully equipped 23-foot research vessel Mount Mitchell of the NOAA of the United States, in cooperation with ROPME and UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC). Investigations were carried out at a large number of stations covering almost the entire ROPME sea area. The results of the expedition provide the scientific basis for the rehabilitation of the marine and coastal environment in the ROPME sea area. The main findings and conclusions are summarized in paragraphs 9 to 17 below.

## 3. Impacts of oil pollution

### Effects on water

9. In the water column, decomposition of the oil was found to be relatively fast. Concentrations of the breakdown products (oxidation products) of oil were found to be about 10 times higher than concentrations of their parent hydrocarbons. Subsurface oil was present in many areas in a variety of habitats. Oil-saturated intertidal waters were common in many of the intertidal habitats.

10. The results of the analyses of trace metals in water samples, do not indicate that the trace metal content of the water has increased as a consequence of the conflict.

### Effects on sediments

11. The subtidal sediments in the near offshore areas of the ROPME sea area, from Kuwait to Qatar, were found to contain relatively low and uniform concentrations of polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons. In the areas investigated there was no evidence of large-scale sinking of oil. Following diverse observations at over 150 locations, oil was observed at three sites, all of which were channel bottoms where tarballs were accumulating.

12. Preliminary chemical analysis provided some indication of wide-spread, low-level oil contamination of the fine-grained sediments. Highest levels of contamination were found in the muddy sediments accumulating in the dredged channels at the head of Dawhat ad Dafi and relatively high concentrations were also measured in the sheltered interior bays of Dawhat al Musallimiyah.

Effects on the shoreline

13. Much of the residual oil exhibited considerable weathering. However, there were areas of heavy oil which remained relatively fresh and continued to be released as sheens.

Effects on coral reefs

14. The expedition was unable to reveal any demonstrable, direct effects of the 1991 oil release on the coral reefs in most of the ROPME sea area. Coral reefs appeared to be in good condition. However, the corals of the three reefs examined in Kuwait, at Qita't Urayfijan, Taylor Rock and Kubbar Island, showed signs of stress. It must be realized that the survey team visited only an arbitrarily selected portion of each reef and a limited number of reefs at each station.

Effects on seagrass and algal mats

15. Three species of seagrass were examined (Halodule unireivo, Holoplaeta ovolis and Holophila stipalacea). There were no significant effects on the respiration or photosynthesis of the seagrass. These results, coupled with the field observations suggest that the oil had little effect on the subtidal seagrasses of the northern part of the ROPME sea area.

Effects on fisheries

16. Biological studies were concentrated in the western ROPME sea area and because of the limited number of fish and plankton samples collected, it is still premature to establish geographic trends along the western margin of the area. The question of whether there has been a general decline in the region's fish and shrimp stocks is yet to be addressed.

17. Experiences from oil pollution studies in other parts of the world suggest that commercially caught fishery products do not constitute a health hazard to the average consumer.

## B. Atmospheric pollution, including long-term effects on human health

18. A meeting of experts to assess the atmospheric effects of the Kuwait oil fires, organized by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in cooperation with UNEP at Geneva from 25 to 29 May 1992, the results of extensive aerial reconnaissance surveys of the fire plumes, were analysed. The major findings 2/ are summarized in paragraphs 19 to 24 below.

Effects on global climate

19. The total emissions of carbon dioxide are estimated to be 3 x $10^8$ tonnes, which is about 1.5 per cent of the world-wide annual emissions from fossil fuel and biomass burning. The calculated effect of such carbon dioxide emissions on global warming is so small that it will be immeasurable.

Effects on regional and local weather

20. Local and regional temperatures and solar flux were reduced under the plume. However, there is no evidence that regional weather was consistently affected.

Ground-level concentrations and their relation to human health

21. High concentrations of particulate matter have been common in the region, making it difficult to determine the contribution from the oil well fires without chemical analysis. Levels observed were not high enough, however, to cause observed acute health effects.

22. In Kuwait and Saudi Arabia the ground-level concentrations of nitrogen dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, hydrogen sulphide and ozone did not exceed the local and recognized standards. There were instances in which sulphur dioxide concentrations exceed the local standards. However, generally the population was not exposed to persistently high concentrations of gases.

23. Soot and oil mist covered the soil surface and vegetation in large areas, with the soot-affected area extending into Saudi Arabia. Most of the native vegetation in the soot-affected areas was adversely affected. The annual flora failed to set seed. The long-term impacts of soot and oil deposition are unclear.

Immediate and long-term effects on human health

24. Air pollution resulting from the burning oil wells in Kuwait represented a potential hazard to human health. However, in view of the fact that the smoke plume was, on average confined to heights between 500 m and 4 km above ground level, the immediate hazard to human health was drastically reduced. Nevertheless, possible long-term effects are still uncertain.

## C. Terrestrial ecosystem including hazardous wastes

25. Initial surveys were carried out August and September 1991 by the UNEP (Terrestrial Ecosystems Branch (Soil Unit) and the Regional Office for West Asia - ROWA). Three comprehensive reports on the results of the survey and assessment mission in Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were published by UNEP/Terrestrial Ecosystems Branch (Soils)/Rowa. 3/ The main findings of these surveys are summarized in paragraphs 26 to 30 below.

26. Hazardous wastes were surveyed by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and indicated that the risk to the environment and human health will remain fairly acute until plans are designed and implemented to assess and clean up the disposal sites, both in Kuwait and Iraq, each according to its particular characteristics.

27. The loosening of desert soil surface by military activities posed severe environmental problems in the region. Dunes are already being formed and

continue to threaten roads and farms. The number of dust storms has already doubled.

28. Some media reports in January 1993 indicated the possibility that depleted uranium shells (penetrators) might have been used during the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, posing a serious threat to human health in these countries. The reports have not been confirmed by independent sources.

Iraq

29. Drainage water accumulated and raised the water table increasing soil salinity in vast agricultural areas; destruction of fertilizer plants left the country without these inputs; toxic chemicals were spilled into soil and into running streams; both crops and livestock were very adversely affected.

Kuwait

30. Serious damage to the terrestrial ecosystem was observed in Kuwait. Soot and oil mist covered the soil surface and vegetation over large areas; oil escaping from exploded wells accumulated to form oil lakes extending over large areas of the desert, in some cases with depths of up to 1 metre or more. Estimates of the quantity of oil accumulated in these pools range between 25 million and 50 million barrels.

## IV. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

31. The conflict between Iraq and Kuwait had serious socio-economic impacts on the countries of the region and beyond. The Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme, in its decision 91/21 of 25 June 1991, 4/ requested the convening of a funding strategy meeting to consider a draft proposal for the socio-economic and environmental recovery of countries affected by the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. In that connection, UNEP prepared a Consolidated Rehabilitation Programme, containing a proposed programme for the environmental rehabilitation of the region, the implementation of which would assist in the alleviation of the above socio-economic problems.

## V. FOLLOW-UP INITIATIVES

32. While the United Nations inter-agency efforts proceeded at the technical level, further attention was being paid to the political and financial aspects of the environmental crisis. A Consolidated Rehabilitation Programme for the environment of the ROPME region and a priority action programme were prepared by UNEP in cooperation with the ROPME secretariat. The Programme incorporated costed and targeted project proposals covering the three environmental components, technical cooperation aspects, and the needs of the countries of the region with respect to oil clean-up, recovery and restoration. The Rehabilitation Programme was presented by UNEP to a meeting of some 70 States Members of the United Nations, including major potential donors.

33. The environmental rehabilitation issue was later brought up at the third special session of the Governing Council of UNEP. In order to keep the environmental crisis at the forefront of the international political arena, the Secretary-General of the United Nations requested his special representative to visit Kuwait during March 1992 to reassess the situation after the capping of the burning oil wells. The visit to Kuwait was carried out from 29 to 31 March 1992, during which the Secretary-General's special representative, accompanied by a senior staff member of UNEP, held talks at the highest possible level. The Secretary-General's representative discussed various options for rehabilitation strategies and funding possibilities. The outcome of the visit was brought to the attention of the Secretary-General and the Executive Director of UNEP, in order for an acceptable strategy to be formulated and applied as soon as adequate resources become available.

34. The Governing Council of UNEP recognized, in its decision 17/7 of 21 May 1993, 5/ that financial resources need to be mobilized to support: (a) further investigation of the long-term impacts of the environmental effects of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait; (b) the ROPME programmes related to this issue; and (c) efforts for needed assessment and rehabilitation programmes. The Council also requested the Executive Director of UNEP to continue the lead role of UNEP in coordination of the efforts of the United Nations and international organizations in respect of the above-mentioned points.

35. In view of the fact that the voluntary contributions received in the special trust fund set up by the Executive Director of UNEP only covered partially the planned coordinated activities carried out in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf crisis and that these contributions were not further augmented by contributions from the Gulf States, UNEP has undertaken to make an effort to mobilize further funding if and when affected Gulf States were to make moneys available for the objectives summarized in paragraph 34 above.

36. UNEP has taken further initiatives to address the issue of additional contributions to the rehabilitation programme. At the most recent meeting of the ROPME Council in Kuwait, from 27 to 28 October 1993, the UNEP representative proposed and the Council accepted, that:

> "as an alternative way to finance the rehabilitation programmes, the present outstanding contributions (KD 4,853,724 = approximately US$ 15 million) could be set aside to be put into a special fund for the rehabilitation programme. ..., if the ROPME member States commit to contribute funds to the extent of 30 per cent of the budget required for the rehabilitation programme, UNEP would adhere to the agreement made by the former Executive Director of UNEP to assist ROPME in raising two thirds of the funds for the rehabilitation programme, whatever the scale may be".

37. UNEP has organized a meeting with representatives of the oil and petroleum industry to explore cost-effective means to address long-term effects of large oil spills based on the experience in the Gulf. The meeting is scheduled to take place in June 1994.

38. UNEP has continued its discussions with several specialized agencies of the United Nations above the modalities, including financial requirements, of determining how further investigations of the long-term impacts of the Gulf crisis can go forward.

## Notes

1/ Report on the United Nations Inter-agency Plan of Action for the ROPME Region - Phase I: Initial Surveys and Preliminary Assessment, UNEP, 12 October 1991.

2/ Report of the Second WMO Meeting of Experts to Assess the Response to and Atmospheric Effects of the Kuwait Oil Fires (Called in collaboration with UNEP). WMO, Global Atmosphere Watch No. 81, Ref. WMO/TD-No. 512, 1992.

3/ A Rapid Assessment of the Impacts of the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict on Terrestrial Ecosystems. Part I: Iraq; Part II: Kuwait; Part III: Saudi Arabia. UNEP/Terrestrial Ecosystems Branch (Soils)/Regional Office for West Asia, Bahrain, September 1991.

4/ Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1991, Supplement No. 13 (E/1994/34), annex I.

5/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eight Session, Supplement No. 25, annex.

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STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES OR REGIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly and of the Security Council the progress report of the United Nations special mission to Afghanistan, in pursuance of paragraph 4 (a) of General Assembly resolution 48/208 of 21 December 1993, entitled "Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan".

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ANNEX

Progress report of the special mission to Afghanistan

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The international community has observed the continuing conflict in Afghanistan and its deleterious effects with mounting concern. On 21 December 1993, the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/208, entitled "Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan". In paragraph 4 (a) of the resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General "to dispatch to Afghanistan, as soon as possible, a United Nations special mission to canvass a broad spectrum of the leaders of Afghanistan, soliciting their views on how the United Nations can best assist Afghanistan in facilitating national rapprochement and reconstruction, and to submit its findings, conclusions and recommendations to the Secretary-General for appropriate action."

2. On 1 January 1994, fighting intensified in Kabul and several other locations in Afghanistan, provoking further concern about the deteriorating situation in the country, especially the significant civilian casualties, the large number of displaced persons and the failure of the Afghan leaders to resolve their differences peacefully. In this connection, the Secretary-General issued two statements, on 4 and 12 January 1994, respectively, calling for, inter alia, an immediate cessation of the hostilities. His second statement supported the early dispatch of the special mission once conditions permitted and was issued in consultation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and the United States of America. On 24 January 1994, the Security Council issued its first presidential statement on Afghanistan (S/PRST/1994/4) since 12 August 1992. The statement, among other things, reiterated the Secretary-General's call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General to dispatch the mission as soon as possible.

3. On 14 February 1994, Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri was appointed by the Secretary-General to head the special mission to Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, he came to New York where he met various Afghan government officials, including two Deputy Foreign Ministers as well as the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations. He also met with representatives of Iran, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and the United States, as well as other countries. He travelled to Washington where he met the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia of the United States, as well as other State Department officials dealing with Afghanistan.

4. On 14 March 1994, the Secretary-General made public his intention to dispatch the mission as soon as possible. On 23 March, the Security Council issued a second presidential statement on the situation in Afghanistan (S/PRST/1994/12), which, among other things, expressed its support for the mission and urged all Afghans to assist it in carrying out its mandate and thus

promote the cessation of hostilities, the resumption of humanitarian aid and the restoration of peace in Afghanistan.

5. The wide support for the special mission in the General Assembly, which unanimously adopted resolution 48/208, is an important indication of the international community's desire to begin a more active effort to help end the conflict in Afghanistan. In addition, the special mission was greatly assisted by the statements of the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

6. On 27 March 1994, the special mission, headed by Mr. Mestiri, began its work in Afghanistan. In addition to Mr. Mestiri, the mission included: Mr. Mousouris, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, as Mr. Mestiri's Deputy; Mr. Francis Okelo, Senior Political Affairs Officer (Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan); Mr. Charles Santos, Political Affairs Officer for Afghanistan (Department of Political Affairs); Mr. Juan de Castro, Economic Affairs Officer (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), Mr. John Mills, Spokesman; and Colonel Harry Quirke, Military Adviser (Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan). During its visits to regional and other interested countries, as well as its meetings with Afghan personalities in Europe, the Mission's composition varied.

7. The substantive and logistical support provided by the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the assistance by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations specialized agencies in Afghanistan were indispensable. All members of the mission demonstrated a high degree of competence and provided valuable assistance and advice which was greatly appreciated.

8. From 27 March to 29 April 1994, the special mission travelled in Afghanistan to Jalalabad, Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Shebergan, Herat, Bamyan, Kandahar and Khost, and in Pakistan to Peshawar and Quetta, where it held meetings with a number of Afghan leaders, personalities and groups. During this period, it also met with Pakistani officials. It then travelled to Teheran, Riyadh, Moscow and Ankara to meet with senior governmental officials. It travelled to Jeddah to meet with officials of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (see appendix).

9. The mission canvassed the views of Afghans through meetings with leaders and groups, private meetings, large gatherings, public addresses, as well as through memoranda, peace plans, letters and notes which it received. It met with a wide spectrum of political leaders, which included, inter alia, President Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamiat-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hezb-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Governor Haji Qadir and Mr. Abdul Ali Mazari (Hezb-i-Wahdat-e-Afghanistan); General Abdul Rashid Dostum (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan); Governor Ismael Khan (Jamiat-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud (Jamiat-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Professor Abdul Rab Rasool Sayaf (Ittehad-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); former President Sibghatullah Mojaddedi (Afghanistan National Liberation Front); Maulawi Younis Khalis (Hezb-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Pir Syed Ahmed Gailani (National Islamic Front for Afghanistan); Commander Jalalludin Haqqani;

Mr. Sayed Mansour Naderi, the leader of Ismailis in Afghanistan; Governor Gul Agha of Kandahar; Commander Amir Lalay; and Mullah Naqib.

10. The mission also canvassed the views of independent personalities, commanders, religious and tribal leaders, scholars, various Shura members, women's groups, and professional, business and student organizations. The mission also met a number of Afghans living abroad, including the former King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah.

## II. FINDINGS

11. Every place it visited, the special mission was warmly greeted by common Afghans as well as those in authority. In fact, in some places it was greeted by thousands, even tens of thousands of people. There were also many spontaneous demonstrations of support, which were often attended by hundreds and in some cases thousands of people.

12. Throughout its itinerary, the mission was approached by numerous Afghans who expressed their thoughts, feelings, ideas and views on how the current situation might be resolved. It received written proposals from most of its Afghan interlocutors, who ranged from political leaders to common Afghans. Most Afghans the mission met presented eloquent and passionate views, many making specific and detailed proposals about the present conflict. In total, the mission received more than 300 peace proposals, letters and requests. It was greatly impressed by the practical and realistic nature of the many ideas and peace proposals, but what was most striking was the convergence of views.

13. Travelling throughout Afghanistan, the mission found that although some parts were still at war, most of the country, at least two thirds, was at peace. It was impressive, for instance, to observe that no arms were seen in the streets of Herat. The effect of the war, however, could be felt throughout the country, spreading instability to various regions. The fighting has forced hundreds of thousands of people, especially from Kabul, to leave their homes, killed and wounded thousands more and obstructed United Nations reconstruction and humanitarian efforts. Moreover, the fighting has undermined the very national institutions necessary to bring peace and to rebuild the country.

14. Wherever the mission met the Afghan public, the people called for an end to the fighting, bloodshed and destruction and the restoration of peace. The Afghan people also called for the United Nations to help end the conflict and bring peace to their country. The expressions of gratitude, support and encouragement were very moving as the people put aside the uncertainties of their present situation to hope again for a better life.

15. The fighting in Kabul seemed mostly to be characterized by artillery, rocket and mortar fire and some bombing. This type of warfare, while generally posing little risk to the combatants themselves, has caused enormous casualties among innocent civilians who have borne the brunt of the exchanges of fire. Since the recent round of fighting began, little territory has changed hands in Kabul.

16. The impression one gets is that many of the soldiers fighting for either side are reluctant to risk their lives in this struggle. Most of the combatants appear to be young men and/or adolescents, many of whom may be illiterate. Over and over again, the Mission was told that the majority of those fighting were doing so for the money since this was one of the only ways to earn a living, especially in Kabul. One point that was clearly made by numerous Afghans, including many engaged in the fighting, was that the present conflict was not a jihad, but a struggle for power.

17. In several northern locations, fighting appeared to involve more conventional military tactics, i.e., infantry assaults with the objective of seizing particular positions. But once again, very little has changed. Almost all the Afghans that the mission spoke with said that no military solution was possible. Events of the last two years and in particular of the last six months, have clearly demonstrated the futility of the military option.

18. The conflict has had a significant effect throughout the country, increasing tensions in many areas, which have occasionally erupted in fighting. Nevertheless, most regions have generally avoided being drawn into the present confrontation.

19. The present economic situation of the country is characterized by an economic infrastructure that has been almost completely destroyed. The economy appears to have deteriorated further during the last two years, with real output declining in 1992/93. In Kabul, Kandahar and Herat, as well as other places, whole sections have been destroyed. Heavy and large industries in Kabul and other cities have been looted. Roads, bridges, communications, electricity, water, schools, irrigation systems and power plants are in ruin. The banking system and civil aviation are in collapse. Much destruction occurred during the war against foreign occupation and the Communist regime. Nevertheless, serious damage has also occurred since power was transferred in April 1992.

20. Recent indications are that price increases are accelerating, with the prices of certain food items and fuel having increased 200 to 300 per cent during the last fiscal year. This trend is likely to continue as no steps have been taken to establish fiscal control and monetary restraint. The direct effects of war caused a substantial fall in agricultural production, with the southern and south-eastern regions being most affected. Before the war, irrigated land produced 77 per cent of all wheat and 85 per cent of all food and agricultural crops. An estimated 27 to 36 per cent of all irrigation systems were directly affected by war, which does not take into account the indirect effects of neglect and abandonment.

21. The shortage of energy directly affects the lives of most people living in the urban and semi-urban areas of Afghanistan. The present non-availability of power and fuel hampers practically all essential services of society, such as public administration, health care, irrigation, telecommunications, civil aviation, road transport and industrial production. The entire infrastructure for importation, transportation, distribution and storing of petroleum products no longer exists. Most of the Government tanker fleet has been damaged or seized by military groups, and oil pipelines from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are no longer operational. Petroleum products are now

widely imported in small quantities by individuals and private entrepreneurs. However, this type of operation is affected by the security situation and is currently not sufficiently organized to meet the needs of the country.

22. As a result of the destroyed infrastructure, only a few local economies have been able to function in certain regions, and the re-emergence of a national and interregional economy has been prevented. In addition, because of the present conflict, national economic institutions have not been able to manage the economy successfully.

23. The main points of agreement the special mission found are listed below:

(a) All Afghans that the mission met unanimously expressed a profound yearning for peace, condemned the current fighting and demanded that it end immediately. They said the fighting was causing untold death, destruction, injury, dislocation and human suffering and viewed the termination of hostilities as a necessary step to begin a political process;

(b) Every Afghan expressed great pride in the victory against foreign occupation and the toppling of the Communist regime. They also expressed appreciation for the sacrifices of the Mujahideen; however, they stressed that they were greatly disappointed that some of their leaders were engaged in the fighting;

(c) All Afghans demanded that the Government of Afghanistan represent the will of the Afghan people. They demanded that all segments of Afghan society be allowed to participate in an equitable and inclusive political process. They also expressed scepticism at whether the present political arrangements could achieve this;

(d) All the people the special mission met, including all the political leaders, were emphatic that foreign interference was fuelling and prolonging hostilities in Afghanistan and that this had to end in order for reconciliation to proceed. Many Afghans, including most of the leaders, requested that the United Nations help prevent foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan;

(e) Even though Afghanistan is a diverse society with many ethnic, tribal and religious affiliations, the people widely identify themselves, first and foremost, as Afghans and Muslims. All Afghans wanted to ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Afghanistan;

(f) There was wide support for a transitional period during which a broad-based transitional authority would restore order and security, collect weapons and prepare for some type of assembly or election that would fully reflect the will of the Afghan people;

(g) Most Afghans strongly felt that the international community and the United Nations had deserted Afghanistan for the past two years. They often emphasized that this was probably the last chance to bring peace to their country. They expressed appreciation for the present United Nations approach, which they said had the best chance of bringing peace to the country. In their

discussions with the mission, the Afghans often implored the United Nations not to abandon or fail them and to be involved at every stage of the political process. In this connection, many Afghans called upon the United Nations to re-establish and maintain its physical presence throughout the country and in particular in Kabul;

(h) Most Afghans opposed a non-Afghan armed military presence, including United Nations peace-keeping troops. They said that they would not accept any armed foreign presence in their country. Nevertheless, almost all supported some form of United Nations monitoring, which could oversee a cease-fire and the collection of heavy weapons and supervise elections;

(i) Most Afghans called for a collection of arms and the demilitarization of the country, with many saying it should begin in Kabul. Some groups suggested that there might be some programme of repurchasing or compensation in exchange for weapons. Many suggested that the United Nations should assist in monitoring the disarmament process;

(j) There was wide consensus that a major international effort to assist in the reconstruction of the country was absolutely essential, with particular emphasis on the physical infrastructure of the country. Assistance was also required to help to re-establish medical and educational services and rebuild public institutions, as well as to help address the problem of narcotics trafficking. Afghans viewed the lack of economic alternatives as one of the causes of the war. Many were disappointed that the international community had not provided more assistance. All Afghans, including the leaders, were in favour of starting reconstruction efforts as soon as possible. They viewed reconstruction as integral to establishing a sustainable peace process;

(k) There appeared to be a wide consensus that some sort of security force should be established, initially for Kabul, which would become the nucleus of a national army;

(l) Afghans felt that an important objective of the peace process should be the formulation and adoption of a new constitution that would embody the national sentiment and identity;

(m) In addition to the United Nations, many Afghans expressed confidence and support for the Organization of the Islamic Conference playing a role in the peace process, including the type of monitoring described above;

(n) There was widespread agreement that refugees should be repatriated, with the aid of the international community, and that their participation in the peace process should be facilitated even before their return;

(o) There were also calls for a United Nations role in monitoring human rights until security and confidence were established.

24. The many proposals received, including those of the political leaders, often went into great detail on the mechanics of establishing an acceptable political process. It was often in the very complex mechanisms that differences of opinion could be noted. But the special mission found many Afghans to be

flexible about their proposals and willing to entertain modifications or changes in order to make the proposals more acceptable.

25. There were some basic differences which focused on the nature and type of the political process, for example, whether there should be a Shura (a consultative body or council), Loya Jirgha (a traditional grand council or assembly), elections, or some combination thereof. Although almost all Afghans expressed the desire for some form of transitional period in which functional governance would be restored, there was a difference of opinion, especially among the leaders, on the type, number and order of steps necessary to achieve this end. Even though some opposed it, the Loya Jirgha was often mentioned as a forum through which a representative government could be established. Nevertheless, there were differences as to its timing, composition and function, as well as how it would be convened.

26. All the regional and other interested countries that the special mission visited, including Iran, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States, expressed their full support for the United Nations efforts and offered whatever assistance was necessary. Moreover, all countries consulted emphasized that they were interested in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan in which the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty were maintained and where the Afghan people would determine their government, free from outside interference.

27. The special mission held two meetings, at Jeddah and Islamabad respectively, with Ambassador Bakr, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and representative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference for Afghanistan. The discussions focused on how the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference could cooperate to bring peace to Afghanistan.

## III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

28. The fact that the vast majority of Afghans appear to believe that the present conflict is a struggle for power should be of serious concern. The latest phase of the conflict, which began on 1 January 1994, has ruptured the remaining vestiges of a functioning central administration in Afghanistan, which were put into place by agreements negotiated at Islamabad and Jalalabad.

29. The mission was struck not only by the universal belief among Afghans that significant and systematic foreign involvement was taking place, but also by the depth of resentment towards those perceived to be fuelling the conflict in Afghanistan. Even though all the mission's regional interlocutors expressed their full support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Afghanistan, such perceptions should be of concern to the international community.

30. Afghanistan is now one of the world's largest producers of opium as well as other narcotic drugs. Little money apparently goes to those who grow the illicit crops. Most of the money seems to be made elsewhere. It is obvious

that the lack of central authority and the instability in the country have contributed to an increase in production and trafficking of illicit drugs.

31. The conflict in Afghanistan also flourishes because of the chaotic economic situation and the lack of viable economic alternatives. Many outside of Afghanistan have argued that it is necessary to have peace first, then reconstruction. But the mission believes that reconstruction assistance should not be seen as separate from but integral to a lasting political solution. Political and economic activity are interrelated and interconnected forces, which must be linked in Afghanistan in ways which encourage peace. It is important to point out that in areas where such forces have been encouraged, one sees the beginnings of sustainable economic activity, responsible political leadership and effective administration.

32. Although it may not be possible to begin reconstruction efforts at the same time a political process is being initiated, it is essential that reconstruction efforts begin soon thereafter. Until the infrastructure of the country is repaired and public health and education are restored, the prerequisites for a stable financial system will not emerge and the Afghan economy will remain in its shattered state.

33. UNDP, with the assistance of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), has implemented some successful but limited reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, which have focused primarily on reconstruction and rehabilitation of irrigation systems, roads, bridges and housing and the production of seeds for agricultural use. These efforts have often been coupled with de-mining operations and have been successful in encouraging economic activity and normalcy in some areas. In these cases, the restart of economic activity has attracted the return of displaced persons as well as refugees. The reconstruction approach of UNDP, which seeks to cooperate with local Shuras (councils) at the district level, has shown great promise in determining and implementing projects for the revitalization of local communities. A number of other agencies and programmes of the United Nations system, including the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan (UNOCHA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), have been implementing a variety of important projects, which, in addition to their humanitarian purpose, are complementary to the efforts for reconstruction.

34. Even though ethnic and tribal tensions exist and have widened over the past two years owing to the current conflict, the widespread notion of Afghanistan as a sovereign and independent State still remains a powerful force. The unity of the Afghan nation, however, is increasingly coming under threat from the present conflict. Not only has it undermined the capacity of the political leaders to provide for the basic needs of the people, but also it has eroded the legitimacy and importance of governmental institutions needed to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of the State itself. If nothing is done to stem the violence and begin a political process in which all segments of Afghan society are represented, including all ethnic, tribal and religious groups, disintegration could increasingly become a serious possibility, with grave regional and international implications.

35. It is clear to almost everyone in Afghanistan, even to many of those engaged in the fighting, that no military victory by either side is possible. A continuation of the war serves no purpose, except to prevent the emergence of a truly representative political process and the reconstruction of the country. It seems that the Afghan people are losing or have lost confidence in the ability of many of their leaders to resolve their differences peacefully. They have not yet lost faith in their country.

36. At the national level, what is needed is the establishment of an acceptable transitional authority which could oversee a cease-fire, institute a process of disarmament, provide security throughout the country, especially in Kabul, and prepare for some form of elections in one to two years. Before such an authority can be established, there must be a country-wide cessation of hostilities. Any successful political process must involve all segments and groups of Afghan society. Afghans are looking for peace. Many leaders to whom the mission spoke are ready, with the assistance of the United Nations, to work to establish a peace process.

37. The Afghans were adamant that the United Nations should not leave them, imploring the Organization and the international community not fail them. At present, no regional or other country has the support and respect that the United Nations still commands in Afghanistan. The Afghans have seen how the lack of international attention has, in part, fed instability by creating the impression that the world did not care whether there was peace or war in Afghanistan.

38. Clearly, it is time for the United Nations and the international community to assist the Afghans more actively in bringing peace to their country. The international community and the United Nations must stay engaged for peace. A successful comprehensive effort to encourage peace would have to link international reconstruction assistance to a national political dialogue on acceptable transitional arrangements. Such an effort would also have to pursue concerted and coordinated efforts to encourage regional disengagement.

39. The opportunity exists to alter the present stalemated political and military equation with practical diplomatic approaches - not with large peace-keeping forces or some other expansive international effort - and move Afghanistan away from war and towards peace. In any effort, it is important to rely not only on the desire of all Afghans to end the war, but also on Afghan ingenuity and faith in their nation to move the peace process forward. The Afghans saw the United Nations as the last and only way out. There should be no illusions that this will be an easy task. It will require patience, steadfastness and creative political approaches, but it is possible to create a momentum for peace.

40. The first phase of a re-engaged United Nations effort would incorporate the following:

(a) Given the great demand by all Afghans for the United Nations to be in Afghanistan, the Organization should re-establish its physical political presence at Kabul. If this is not possible, Jalalabad could serve as a provisional location, with the political representative making numerous visits

to Kabul as well as visits to other cities. Other specialized agencies and programmes might also consider moving more fully back into Afghanistan, especially UNDP, in order for the political and reconstruction aspects to be more closely coordinated on the ground in Afghanistan. Governments should also be encouraged to re-establish their presence in Afghanistan;

(b) Given the necessity for greater international action and attention to be focused on the situation in Afghanistan, it is recommended that a working group of countries interested in peace, normalcy and reconstruction in Afghanistan be established which would assist closely United Nations peace efforts and eventually prepare an international conference on Afghanistan;

(c) It is recommended that the United Nations begin serious and in-depth consultations with the various Afghan leaders on the establishment of a viable transitional authority and a complete and total cease-fire;

(d) A country-wide cease-fire and the establishment of a transitional authority are essential if conditions are to be established for free and fair elections. Such elections would be the best way to ensure that all segments of Afghan society participate in determining the future of the country. Furthermore, it may be beneficial to explore the possibility of utilizing indigenous decision-making structures, such as a grand assembly or council, to facilitate the necessary conditions for elections.

## APPENDIX

### Itinerary of the special mission

1. At Islamabad, the special mission began talks with a view to arranging a cease-fire that would enable it to visit Kabul and meet with representatives of the parties engaged in the hostilities, as well as representatives from other segments of Afghan society. While arrangements for the cease-fire at Kabul were being made, the mission travelled to Jalalabad on 30 March 1994, where it visited and heard the views of the displaced persons who had fled Kabul since the beginning of January. It also met with the Governor of Jalalabad, Haji Qadir, the Shuras of the provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman and Kunar and about 200 tribal leaders and intellectuals.

2. From 2 to 6 April 1994, the mission held meetings at Kabul with His Excellency Burhanuddin Rabbani, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan; His Excellency Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Prime Minister; Mr. Abdul Ali Mazari, leader of Hezb-i-Wahdat; Professor Abdul Rab Rasool Sayaf, leader of the Ittehad-i-Islami; Mr. Abdul Karim Khalili, Minister of Finance, along with the Minister of Commerce and Mr. Murtazavi; Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud; and representatives of the Supreme Coordination Council, including Dr. H. Mojaddedi of the Afghan National Liberation Front, General Fauzi of Jumbish-i-Milli, a representative of the Hezb-i-Wahdat and Humayun Jarir of Hezb-i-Islami. In addition, the mission met with Commander Jalalludin Haqqani; Mohammad Ali Jawed, Deputy Leader of the Harakat-i-Islami and Minister of Planning; Dr. Najibullah Lafraie, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Arsalan Rahmany, Deputy Prime Minister, along with the Vice President of Harakat (Mohammadi); and the Governor and a Shura of Logar in Mohammad Agha, where an outdoor meeting was held. It also met with the Council of 14 Provinces, led by General Zaher Azimi (Harakat); the Emam Ghazzali Foundation; the Mayor of Kabul, Mr. Fazl Karim Aimagh; and a gathering of the district representatives at the City Hall. It met with the Coordination Council of the Displaced People, other representatives of displaced people, the Lawyers' Association, the Association of Peace Servants, a group of professors from Kabul University, the Afghan Women's Association and other social organizations. In various parts of the city and its surroundings, the mission met with several organized and spontaneous gatherings of large numbers of people who submitted petitions and notes.

3. On 16 and 17 April, the special mission visited Mazar-i-Sharif, where it was greeted by thousands of people. The mission met with General Abdul Rashid Dostum, Chairman of the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, and other members of the Movement. It also met with intellectuals, professionals, representatives of a medical doctors' association and women's groups, elders from Mazar-i-Sharif, representatives from the northern provinces and displaced people. It held meetings with a number of political figures, including Mr. Sayed Mansour Naderi, the leader of Ismailis in Afghanistan, and Mr. Tawana Taleghani, and visited the camp of displaced people from Kabul. It then travelled by road to Shibergan, where it attended an outdoor meeting of tens of thousands of people, who enthusiastically voiced their support for the

mission and during which many proposals were submitted. The mission then held private talks with General Dostum.

4. On 18 and 19 April, the mission was in Herat, where it held several meetings with Governor Ismael Khan. It also met with a gathering of governors, commanders and other representatives from 14 Afghan provinces, who presented their peace plan. In addition, the mission met with Dr. Jalil Shams, Deputy Foreign Minister, prominent personalities, women's groups and business leaders. The mission also attended the celebration of the second anniversary parade of the liberation of Herat.

5. On 20 April, the mission arrived in Bamyan, where it was received by a large crowd, and attended a rally where leaders presented their views on the conflict. It also had meetings with the head and members of the Shura of Bamyan, with representatives of displaced families, women's groups and Hazara delegations from Bamyan, Uruzgan and Ghazni. It also met tribal elders, representatives of the Hezb-i-Wahdat and a delegation from the province of Parwan.

6. On 23 April and again on 25 April, the mission held meetings at Quetta with the Afghan Consul, Haji Abdul Khaliq, the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdul Hamed Karzai, and a large group of commanders from Kandahar. It also met with delegations from the provinces of Helmand, Zabul and Kandahar. In addition, it met with tribal chiefs and elders representing the Popalzai, Noorzai, Barekzai, Alekozai, Ishaqzai, Aleezai, Achekzai, Tokhi, and Mohammadzai tribes and with representatives from Arghistan, Marouf and Spin Boldak. In addition, the mission held meetings with religious leaders, some 300 persons from Quetta and the southeastern provinces, two groups of students, women's groups, and intellectuals.

7. On 24 April, the mission travelled to Kandahar, where thousands of people greeted it at the airport and outside the Governor's residence. Along with the Governor of Kandahar Province, Gul Agha, the mission met two important commanders, Amir Lalay and Mullah Naqib, as well as other elders and commanders from Kandahar and neighboring provinces. It was unable to meet with another commander, Mr. Sarkateb Atta Mohammed.

8. The mission held meetings at Peshawar on two occasions, from 9 to 11 April and on 26 April. During its first visit, it met with the former Afghan President, Mr. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, leader of the Afghan National Liberation Front; Mr. Maulawi Younis Khalis, leader of the Hezb-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan; and Pir Syed Ahmed Gailani, leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan. It also met with Maulawi Tarakheel, Deputy Prime Minister Qutbuddin Hilal, Commander Abdul Haq, Minister of Repatriation Farouq Azam, Dr. Taleb and accompanying representatives of the Hezb-i-Wahdat. It also held meetings with delegations from the provinces of Kunar and Paktia and Shinwari tribal leaders. The mission also met with a group of Afghan organizations, including Afghan Mellat party, the Movement for National Unity, the Afghanistan All Mujahids Great United National Islamic Big Jabhah, the Organization for Peace and Disarmament and the Afghan League of Human Rights. In addition, the mission met with Commander Haqqani's Deputy and representatives of Hezb-i-Wahdat. Meetings were also held with tribal leaders, representatives of Afghan women's

associations, a group of Afghan personalities and the Council for Understanding and National Unity of Afghanistan. On 26 April, it met representatives of the Ahmadzai tribe. Owing to their absence from Peshawar, the mission was not able to meet the leader of the Harakat-i-Inquilab-i-Islami, Mr. Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, and the leader of the Harakat-i-Islami, Mr. Mohammad Asef Mohseni.

9. On 28 April, the special mission travelled to Khost and met there with the Governor and Shura, as well as many other leaders, who explained their views at an outdoor assembly of hundreds of people.

10. While at Islamabad, the mission met with Afghan Ambassador Roshan and Foreign Minister Arsala. It also met with Ambassador Bakr, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Representative for Afghanistan of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and several ambassadors accredited to Pakistan.

11. At Rome, the Mission met with the former King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, and at Geneva with several former leaders, including Mr. Samad Hamed, former Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan. At Bonn, the mission met a gathering, chaired by Mr. Mohammad Yussef, former Prime Minister of Afghanistan, and attended by some 40 Afghan personalities and former leaders presently residing in Europe and the United States of America.

12. The special mission also met with representatives of regional and other countries, which have a special interest in the situation in Afghanistan and may be in a position to assist in the peace process. In this connection, it travelled to the capitals of a number of countries, where it held discussions with, among others, Ms. Robin Raphel, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia of the United States, President Farouk Leghari and Foreign Minister Sardar Asef Ali of Pakistan, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Saoud al Faysal, Foreign Minister Velayati, Interior Minister Besharati and Deputy Foreign Minister Boroujerdi of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Mr. Ivanov, as well as Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin and Mr. Ozdem Sanberk, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey.

13. Consultations were also held at Jeddah with the Representative for Afghanistan of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Regrettably, the mission was unable to visit Uzbekistan owing to a scheduling problem. It intends to do so and meet with President Karimov in the near future.

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# REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS

## Transparency of military expenditures

## Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/49/50/Rev.1.

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The General Assembly, at its forty-eighth session, adopted resolution 48/62 of 16 December 1993, entitled "Reduction of military budgets: transparency of military expenditures", calling upon all Member States to participate in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures as adopted by the General Assembly. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on ways and means to strengthen, and to broaden participation in, the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and to submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session.

2. In pursuance of that request, the Secretary-General addressed a note verbale on 28 February 1993 to the Governments of Member States inviting them to submit their views by 31 May 1994.

3. To this date, the Secretary-General has received replies from Bulgaria, Ethiopia and Finland.

## II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

### BULGARIA

[Original: English]

[10 June 1994]

1. The Republic of Bulgaria participates regularly in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures as adopted by the General Assembly. In April 1994, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 40/91 B of 12 December 1985, the Bulgarian Government reported to the Secretary-General its military expenditures for the 1993 fiscal year using the United Nations reporting instrument.

2. As to the proposals by certain Member States on actual expenditures reporting, provided for consultations in 1993, the current stage in the development of the national accounting mechanism concerning the defence expenditures by type of resource costs, as well as considerations related to the structure of the Bulgarian Army discourage acceptance of such proposals.

## ETHIOPIA

[Original: English]

[4 May 1994]

1. It is to be remembered that Ethiopia used to spend billions of dollars on arms during the past regime. Defence used to account for more than 50 per cent of the national budget. However, the picture has changed drastically since peace has prevailed and the country is actively engaged in economic reconstruction. Defence now accounts for a little more than 10 per cent of the national budget, and this has been the case for the last three years.

2. Moreover, no arms have been imported after the downfall of the past regime. The arms Ethiopia possesses at the moment are only those which were purchased by the former Government. The bulk of them are now, in fact, junk and hence hardly of any use. Ethiopia keeps the rest only for defence purposes.

3. In this connection, the Transitional Government would like to reaffirm its readiness to cooperate with the Secretary-General in this regard whenever requested.

## FINLAND

[Original: English]

[22 June 1994]

1. Finland has actively participated in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures since its adoption by the United Nations. We would also like to point out that the members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) have agreed on the system of reporting of their military expenditures based on the United Nations standardized reporting system. Information gained from both of these systems has proved to serve reasonably well the needs of Finland.

2. Would all the Member States fully apply the agreed principles to their reporting, the present United Nations system of standardized reporting could be considered to be effective and to provide enough information. Some defects recognized in the present system could possibly be avoided by including in the reporting system a simple verification mechanism. It could be similar to the one which is applied to the relevant CSCE reporting system and makes it possible for other member States to ask for additional background, information and clarifications about the submitted information. The questions and answers could then be communicated to all Member States. This would, in our view, not only strengthen and broaden the participation in the reporting system, but also promote openness and transparency on military expenditures as well as enhance the flow of objective information on military matters in general.

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# REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GUIDELINES FOR APPROPRIATE TYPES OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

Report of the Secretary-General

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 9 December 1992, the General Assembly adopted resolution 47/54 D entitled "Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures", the operative part of which reads, inter alia, as follows:

> "The General Assembly,
>
> "4. Appeals to all States to consider the widest possible use of confidence-building measures in their international relations, including bilateral, regional and global negotiations, as an important step towards prevention of conflict and, in times of political tension and crisis, as an instrument for peaceful settlement of conflicts;
>
> "5. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to pursue actively its work on the agenda item entitled 'Transparency in armaments', which includes consideration and elaboration of universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency in military matters;
>
> "6. Invites the Secretary-General to continue to collect relevant information from all Member States;
>
> "7. Appeals to all Member States that have not yet done so to make their contribution to the report of the Secretary-General".

2. Pursuant to that request of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, in a note verbale dated 28 February 1994, invited Member States to provide relevant information on this matter. The replies received are reproduced in section II of the present report.

## II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

### AUSTRIA

[Original: English]

[2 June 1994]

1. As a member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Austria implements the confidence- and security-building measures as agreed upon in the Vienna Document 1992. In the view of Austria, these measures constitute important instruments for confidence-building and thus for conflict prevention in the CSCE region. Within the negotiations of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Austria strives to contribute actively to further enhancement of confidence- and security-building measures.

2. Since Austria is convinced of the positive effects of such measures, in certain cases confidence-building measures which exceed the obligations of the Vienna Document 1992 are carried out on a voluntary basis. Thus, for example, in 1992 the neighbouring countries Slovenia and Italy were invited to observe a

military exercise. In this context, different cooperation agreements between the Federal Ministry of Defence with the corresponding ministries of other States (among those of Bulgaria, Slovenia, Germany, the United States of America and Italy) have to be mentioned.

## COLOMBIA

[Original: Spanish]

[21 June 1994]

1. The implementation of confidence-building measures in relations with other States has been a constant concern in the formulation of Colombian foreign policy, in that it has been perceived as an essential mechanism for the consolidation of peace and security in the region.

2. A climate of confidence is established on the basis of observance of and respect for international law and the non-use of force through the quest for and consolidation of machinery facilitating the peaceful settlement of disputes. Such has been the long-standing policy of Colombia.

3. In this connection Colombia has adopted a number of important multilateral and bilateral measures.

4. In the multilateral sphere we have taken initiatives aimed at strengthening the concepts and conclusions relating to hemispheric security developed by the Organization of American States (OAS), such as the implementation of measures to guarantee democracy, protect human rights and promote economic and social development.

5. In addition we, with the other countries of the region, have agreed upon a conceptual framework for the establishment of machinery underpinning the commitment to mutual defence, the aim of which is to ensure the peace and security of the hemisphere. This has been done through consultation, as in the case of the meetings of government experts on regional confidence-building measures and security machinery, which sought to identify specific measures in pursuance of these objectives.

6. Attention must be drawn within this conceptual framework to one aspect of particular importance which has provided common ground for the States of the region. This is recognition of the fact that the term "security" is not strictly military. Ultimately it is a concept embracing various elements ranging from the economic and social order, and comprehensive development, to questions relating to illicit trafficking in drugs and weapons, and the protection of the environment.

7. For Colombia a new system of hemispheric security must be based on decisive factors in the strengthening of cooperation among States, such as mutual transparency - which can be attained through reciprocal inspection procedures.

8. This approach includes the establishment of the Binational Commissions on Good Neighbourliness and Integration with neighbouring countries: with Venezuela and Ecuador, in 1989; with Panama, in 1992; and with Brazil and Peru, in 1994.

9. The establishment of these Commissions is based on three fundamental elements:

(a) Shared regional values and interests;

(b) Identification of situations imperilling shared values and the design of appropriate pre-emptive and reactive machinery; and

(c) Implementation of the necessary agreements on collective measures to avert and neutralize activities entailing risks.

10. These countries occupy the northern region of the South American continent and have developed an awareness of their common regional interests: the strengthening of their democracies, respect for freedom and political pluralism, economic integration and development of their market economies, promotion of human rights, maintenance of social justice, and, as an ultimate objective, the promotion of the welfare of their peoples and the preservation of peace.

11. Colombia, in a spirit of realism and pragmatism, has designed the machinery of the Commissions on Good Neighbourliness, which, based on the identification of binational interests, formulate appropriate pre-emptive and reactive instruments in response to situations threatening shared values.

12. These instruments draw on the various agreements on binational measures intended to avert and neutralize situations that might engender common threats to economic integration, promotion of trade, judicial cooperation, migration and crime control.

13. The Commissions on Good Neighbourliness and Integration are presided over by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States parties, and meet alternately in each State, at intervals corresponding to progress in their activities.

14. The Colombian national commission comprises high-level representation from the public and private sectors and from frontier areas, whose role is to generate initiatives and assure follow-up of the undertakings entered into by the parties.

15. In the interest of efficiency, operational concerns are delegated to binational technical subcommissions, constituted in accordance with the issues on the agenda: economic and trade integration, border integration, the environment and sustainable development, infrastructure, transport and telecommunications, judicial cooperation, mining and energy, education and culture, tourism, ethnic affairs and health, among others.

16. Consolidation of the objectives of the Commissions on Good Neighbourliness and Integration will, in the medium and long term, strengthen mutual confidence in the region. The Commissions have helped to generate a new concept of international cooperation highlighting the promotion of economic and social development.

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MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Letter dated 28 June 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the European Union, I have the honour to transmit to you the French and English versions of the texts of the Concluding Document of the Inaugural Conference for a Pact on Stability in Europe and of the document for the organization of regional round tables, which were issued on 26 and 27 May 1994 in Paris.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 72 of the preliminary list.

(Signed) Adamantios Th. VASSILAKIS
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/49/50/Rev.1.

ANNEX I

[Original: English and French]

Concluding Document of the Inaugural Conference for a Pact on Stability in Europe

PART 1. AIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE INAUGURAL CONFERENCE FOR A PACT ON STABILITY IN EUROPE

1.1. We, Ministers for Foreign Affairs and representatives of States participating in the Conference, have decided to meet in Paris in response to the European Union's call for the conclusion of a Pact on Stability in Europe.

1.2. We are today at a turning-point in the history of the European continent. Considerable progress has been made along the road to democracy, peace and the unity of Europe. The Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, the Copenhagen Document, the Helsinki 1992 Document, as well as bilateral agreements on good-neighbourly relations are milestones in this process. But we must go further and make these achievements irreversible.

1.3. We believe that the time has come to provide a new impetus to overcoming any remaining divisive tendencies which history has bequeathed to the European continent by means of preventive measures, and we affirm our will to create a climate of confidence which will be favourable to the strengthening of democracy, to respect for human rights and to economic progress and peace, while at the same time respecting the identities of peoples.

1.4. We welcome the efforts deployed for that aim in forums such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Council of Europe. We note the prospects of accession to the European Union which were offered by the Copenhagen European Council to the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe which desire it and the steps of the countries which are drawing closer to the European Union with accession as their goal: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. With this perspective in mind, we have decided to hold a Conference on Stability in Europe, which, following a consultation and negotiation process organized within its framework, should lead to the adoption of a Pact on Stability.

1.5. The objectives of stability will be achieved through the promotion of good-neighbourly relations, including questions related to frontiers and minorities, as well as regional cooperation and the strengthening of democratic institutions through cooperation arrangements to be established in the different fields that can contribute to the objective.

1.6. We agree that the reference principles of the Pact on Stability concerning good-neighbourly relations will be the existing principles and commitments established by the United Nations, CSCE and the Council of Europe, in particular those principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act, in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, in the Copenhagen Document, in the Helsinki

1992 Document and the 1993 Vienna Declaration of the Council of Europe Summit, referring, respectively, to inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity and respect of existing borders, and to national minorities.

1.7. We have decided, as concerns our method, to proceed in a pragmatic manner. The discussions in progress on the various draft agreements and arrangements could also be facilitated by including them in the Pact process. Our aim is to encourage countries which have not yet concluded cooperation and good-neighbourliness agreements and arrangements, including minority and border issues, to do so through a process of bilateral negotiation and regional round tables, the composition and agenda for which will have been freely chosen by the participating countries.

1.8. All the agreements and arrangements reached will be included in the Pact on Stability, to the content of which all the countries concluding the Pact will be committed to giving their full political support. Countries which have already concluded bilateral agreements with their neighbours may also, if they wish, have these agreements included in the Pact. It will become for all those countries which conclude it an essential reference point to give a new quality, founded on the respect for differences and shared values, to relations between the peoples of the whole of Europe.

1.9. We hope that our continent, which has for so long been torn by war, will become an example of accepted diversity for the international community.

## PART 2. OPERATIONAL DECISIONS

2.1. In this spirit our countries have held intensive consultations over the last few months to decide on the problems to be dealt with, the procedures and the timetable to be observed to achieve the goals set. Those consultations have enabled us to agree on the way forward. They bear testimony to the constructive spirit and will to cooperate actively and to succeed which animate our countries.

2.2. Against this background, we note the willingness of the States referred to in paragraph 1.4 to further develop their relations in the spirit of good-neighbourly relations, according to treaties and agreements already concluded, to continue or launch bilateral negotiations and to participate in round tables.

2.3. We also note the willingness of the neighbouring States of the countries referred to in paragraph 1.4 to take part in the process of negotiations when the nature of the problems in question requires their participation, and the willingness of other States to make their contribution to this process of negotiations.

2.4. We take note of the fact that the European Union is ready to play an active role in the bilateral or regional talks. The European Union expresses its readiness to play the role of moderator in the bilateral talks at the request of the interested parties. We note that the European Union is already contributing to the economic restructuring and the strengthening of democratic

institutions in the region and is also prepared to put at the disposal of the countries concerned, in the framework of the existing European Agreements, other agreements and programmes, the appropriate support to facilitate the achievement of the objectives of the Pact.

2.5. Other existing regional structures and international institutions could also contribute, through their activities, to the promotion of constructive cooperation and good-neighbourly relations at the regional level.

2.6. We have agreed that the procedures will call upon the concept of the negotiation tables developed on the basis of the 1992 Helsinki Document, which pointed out regional cooperation as a valuable means of promoting pluralistic structures of stability. These tables will aim, on the one hand, to improve good-neighbourly relations and, on the other hand, to identify the projects of common interest for the participating countries.

ACCORDINGLY:

2.7. We, Ministers for Foreign Affairs and representatives of the States participating in the Conference, have agreed to set up regional round tables. Their composition, the fields of cooperation and the working procedures are defined in a document for the organization of regional round tables (see annex II).

2.8. The aim of these round tables is to create favourable conditions for the establishment and the improvement of good-neighbourly relations, including questions related to minorities and borders.

2.9. We take note of the willingness of the countries referred to in paragraph 1.4 to include the existing good-neighbourly relations agreements in the Pact, if the parties agree, or in the absence of such agreements, to intensify or launch negotiations.

2.10. The countries referred to in paragraph 1.4 willing to negotiate may invite neighbouring or other countries as well as relevant international organizations and institutions to join them at their regional round tables, if they so wish, in order to contribute to the pursuit of good-neighbourly relations, bilaterally and at the regional level.

2.11. The regional round tables will be convened at the earliest opportunity at the invitation of the European Union. In so doing, the Union will closely consult with CSCE which will participate through its institutions.

PART 3

3.1. We ask the European institutions, and CSCE and the Council of Europe in particular, to help to ensure the smooth functioning of the negotiations.

## PART 4. ASSESSMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

4.1. We are determined to achieve our objective, which is the conclusion of the Pact on Stability, as swiftly as possible.

4.2. Accordingly:

- The European Union will set up a group, open to interested States and CSCE, which will meet regularly during the process to see to it that it advances and to facilitate its operation;

- This group could call an interim conference in order to assess progress achieved.

## PART 5. THE FINAL CONFERENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

5.1. The final Conference will be held, if the progress of the proceedings so permits, within one year of the inaugural Conference. It will be responsible for adopting the Pact on Stability.

5.2. The Pact on Stability in Europe will be entrusted to CSCE which will be requested to be responsible for evaluating and for monitoring, according to its procedures, the implementation of the agreements and arrangements as well as the commitments which comprise them, placing the follow-up activities and meetings within the substantive and organizational context of CSCE.

5.3. We are mindful of the political importance of the proposed Pact on Stability and have adopted the concluding documents to guide us in this important endeavour.

ANNEX II

[Original: English and French]

Document for the organization of regional round tables

The present document refers to the Concluding Document of the Inaugural Conference for a Pact on Stability in Europe and in particular to its following paragraphs: 1.7, 2.6, and 2.7 to 2.11.

A. The countries referred to in paragraph 1.4 of the Document are willing to participate in the regional round tables. Their neighbouring countries, other countries willing to give their contribution as well as relevant international organizations and institutions which so wish, could also be invited, without any commitment in this respect ensuing from that for the future, and without prejudice to the content of their contribution.

The objective of the regional round tables will be the identification of arrangements and projects aimed at facilitating the achievement and the realization of agreements and measures for good-neighbourly relations in areas such as those listed below, which are merely indicative:

(a) Regional transborder cooperation;

(b) Questions relating to minorities;

(c) Cultural cooperation, including language training;

(d) Economic cooperation in the region;

(e) Legal cooperation and administrative training;

(f) Environmental problems.

B. For the countries referred to in paragraph 1.4, there will be two round tables: one for the Baltic region; one for the other Central and Eastern European countries.

The round tables will be composed of those of the interested countries in the region mentioned in paragraph 1.4, with the participation of the European Union, of relevant international organizations and institutions and of countries which, with the agreement of the interested countries, wish to contribute to the project.

The Baltic round table should discuss general political issues of the region and should promote regional cooperation relating, for example, to integration of populations of foreign origin, national minorities, language training, ombudsman, transborder activities and maritime cooperation and cooperation among regions of neighbouring countries.

C. The round-table meetings should be grouped both in terms of location and timing, attendance depending on the items to be discussed. The modalities will be determined by the participants of the round tables.

They could be chaired by the European Union and take place either in rotation in the countries of the region or at the invitation of individual countries or of the European Union or possibly at Vienna, at the seat of the Permanent Committee of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The host country, or host organization, should provide at its expense meeting facilities, such as conference rooms, secretarial assistance and interpretation. The European Union has expressed its readiness to bear such expenses when meetings are held at the seat of its institutions.

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